So here's the problem with suspending the Geneva Conventions and instituting a policy of "humane treatment consistent with the spirit of the conventions" - no-one knows exactly what that means.
Army Brig. Gen. Charles H. Jacoby Jr., was sent to Afghanistan in May to check out the prisons there. Just before Jacoby was sent, the Army's Criminal Investigation Division completed an investigation into the 2002 deaths of two Afghanis in Bagram. The report implicated more than two dozen military policemen attached to the 377th MP Command. The 377th had initially been deployed in Afghanistan, but were subsequently transferred to Iraq.
The Army CID report also lists a number of routine abuses committed by the 377th and a battalion of military intelligence officers from Ft. Bragg. They include "slamming prisoners into walls, twisting handcuffs to cause pain, kneeing prisoners, forcing a detainee to maintain "painful, contorted body positions," shackling the detainee's arms to the ceiling, and forcing water into the mouth of the detainee "until he could not breathe." A senior officer with the 377th knew his soldiers were mistreating prisoners but apparently did nothing (the report cites him for dereliction of duty).
The abuse at Abu Ghraib should have been enough to suggest that a review of interrogation practices would be wise. Certainly the fact that the Army CID was investigating deaths would underscore the need for fast action. But I suppose that's either the clarity of hindsight or the simplicity of a civilian's view. Because it wasn't until five months after the Abu Ghraib abuse was revealed and after the completion of the CID report that Jacoby was sent to Afghanistan.
In his review, Jacoby found that only half of the prisons had "posted written orders spelling out approved interrogation practices". In the field, military commanders had no approved guidance, so they were using their own judgment on what was appropriate - "opening the door to abuse and a loss of valuable intelligence". Jacoby characterized the guidance for interrogators in Afghanistan as "weak or non-existent".
Keep in mind that these were the conditions he found a full five months after the abuse at Abu Ghraib came to the attention of the military leadership. We heard a great deal back then about how the abuse there was due to a few rogue soldiers, that there was no systemic problem, that the military was on top of the situation. Uh huh.
I don't understand why the military didn't take the simple steps of clarifying, posting, and enforcing approved interrogation tactics used in any facilities detaining enemy fighters, whatever their classification. Why our battlefied commanders weren't given clear orders on approved interrogation practices. Certainly, you can assume that if interrogators in Iraq where the Geneva Conventions were in full force were crossing the line in terms of approved practices, then it's pretty likely that things weren't going swimmingly in territory where the Conventions have been suspended.
We've been assured that training on detainee treatment has been tightened up, that standard operating procedures and the means to enforce them are in place. That's good. But what I want to know what happened to the military culture I respected so much - the one that placed so much emphasis on accountability, that had leaders "falling on their swords" in ownership of problems. Was this just an illusion? Did I get sucked into the romance of the idea - the noble officer whose honor and integrity require him to step forward and take ownership? Or is accountability a victim of war - is the military's cultural mandate to take responsibility suspended during war time?
The military leadership's response to Abu Ghraib, the lack of standard interrogation practices in the Afghan prisons, the lack of orders on interrogation practices to battlefield commanders - it's not acceptable. It's not okay to say "well, it's fixed now so move on". It's just not okay.
I have no doubt that the grunts and junior officers are still held to a high standard, that they can't pass the buck, avoid consequences, et al. But the brass? It seems like not getting a promotion is deemed a sufficient consequence for real leadership failures in a time of war. I disagree. This, this war and everything connected to it, this is what they train for, prepare for, focus on. This is what they do. And if an officer can't do it, if he can't lead his men effectively, if he can't lead his men to advance instead of damage the reputation of the United States, then I say it's time to boot his ass. Our service men and women need officers that lead with integrity, who take responsibility, who hold themselves to the highest of standards and are role models in and out of the field. They need leaders they can trust to do the right thing and watch their backs. I know they have those leaders. I'm just not sure they have them at the highest levels.
Source: Washington Post, General Cites Problems in US Jails in Afghanistan, R. Jeffrey Smith, 12/3/04
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